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MEDICAL-RELATED EXPULSION 
AND INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 3 
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Elaine Webster*
Abstract
h is article critically reviews the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘the Court’) in cases of expulsion of non-nationals receiving medical care 
for a serious health condition, based upon Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. On only one occasion has the Court found a violation of Article 3. 
To date, critique of this jurisprudence has focused on two points: policy 
considerations evident in the case-law, and the Court’s refusal to i nd a violation in 
respect of applicants not in a terminal phase of illness. h is article begins from an 
alternative perspective. It observes that the Court, whose approach has been 
mirrored by applicants and domestic courts, has not transparently situated the 
alleged inhuman or degrading treatment within circumstances of medical-related 
expulsion; a feature that is unique within the wider body of Article 3 jurisprudence. 
h e extent to which recognising this atypical aspect can shed new light upon the 
past and future trajectory of the case-law is explored. h ree ways of situating the 
Article  3 harm are considered: inhuman/degrading treatment brought about by 
sources within the receiving state; inhuman/degrading treatment inl icted by the 
expelling state; and inhuman/degrading treatment l owing from illness. It is argued 
that more explicit engagement with the nature of the alleged harm would be a 
progressive step towards a richer and appropriately justii ed jurisprudence. h is is 
important for the reasoning of the Court in medical-related expulsion cases and, 
more broadly, for the development of the conceptual scope of Article 3.
* Lecturer, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. <elaine.webster@strath.ac.uk>. h ank you to Mary 
Neal and Sophie Oliver for comments on an earlier drat  of this article.
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Resumen
Este artículo revisa críticamente la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos 
Humanos en casos de expulsión de extranjeros que reciben atención médica debido 
a una condición de salud seria, basada en el artículo 3 del Convenio Europeo de 
Derechos Humanos. Sólo en una ocasión el Tribunal ha establecido la violación del 
artículo 3. Hasta ahora, la crítica de esta jurisprudencia se ha centrado en dos 
puntos: consideraciones evidentes de política en la jurisprudencia, y la denegación 
del Tribunal a encontrar una violación con respecto a los peticionarios que no se 
encuentran en una fase terminal de la enfermedad. Este artículo inicia desde una 
perspectiva alternativa. Se observa que el Tribunal, cuyo enfoque se ha rel ejado por 
los solicitantes y los tribunales nacionales, no ha situado de forma transparente el 
supuesto trato inhumano o degradante dentro de las circunstancias de expulsión 
relacionados con situaciónes medicas; es una característica que es única dentro del 
cuerpo más amplio de la jurisprudencia sobre el artículo 3. Se explora en que medida 
el reconocimiento de este aspecto atípico puede arrojar nueva luz sobre la trayectoria 
pasada y futura de la jurisprudencia. Se consideran tres formas de situar el artículo 
3, el daño: trato inhumano/degradante causado por fuentes dentro del Estado 
receptor; trato inhumano/degradante inl igidos por el Estado que expulsa, y trato 
inhumanos/degradante que l uye de la enfermedad. Se argumenta que un 
compromiso más explícito con la naturaleza del supuesto daño daría un paso 
adelante hacia una jurisprudencia más rica, y debidamente justii cada. Esto es 
importante para el razonamiento del Tribunal en los casos de expulsiónes médicas, 
y de manera más amplia, para el desarrollo de la amplitud conceptual del artículo 3.
1. INTRODUCTION
Several applications invoking the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading 
treatment (Article  3 ECHR) have been made by applicants who are non-nationals 
receiving treatment for a serious medical condition in a Council of Europe state, 
whom the state party wishes to return to the country of origin. D v. United Kingdom, 
15 years ago, is the only case in which the European Court of Human Rights (‘the 
Court’) has found a violation of Article 3.1 h e majority of applications since have 
concerned HIV and Aids, and increasingly mental health.2 D v. United Kingdom 
remains the leading case on medical-related expulsion.
1 As of 1st August 2013. h e European Commission of Human Rights found a violation of Article 3 in 
ECommHR (Report) 9 March 1998, Case No. 30930/96, B.B. v. France; a case later struck out of the 
Court’s list.
2 h e Court summarises its case-law until 2008 in ECtHR (Grand Chamber Judgment) 27 May 2008, 
Case No. 26565/05, N v. United Kingdom, paras. 32–41. Recent applications include ECtHR 
(Judgment) 28 March 2013, Case No. 2964/12, I.K. v. Austria, and ECtHR (Judgment) 15 May 2012, 
Case No. 16567/10, Nacic and others v. Sweden.
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h e continuing relevance of this case was coni rmed in the Grand Chamber 
decision in the 2008 case of N v. United Kingdom. h e Strasbourg Court found that 
there would be no violation of Article 3 if Ms. N were returned to her home country 
of Uganda, despite the negative impact this would have on access to the life-sustaining 
antiretroviral medication and care that she had been receiving. A number of scholars 
responded critically to the Grand Chamber judgment; in particular to the economic 
and political pragmatism evident in the judgment and addressed in the forceful 
dissenting opinion.3
Concern from within the Strasbourg judiciary was reignited in the 2011 case of 
Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium. h e judgment in this case, brought by a Cameroonian 
woman suf ering from HIV, was accompanied by a partly concurring opinion of six of 
the seven Chamber judges.4 h e Court found that the circumstances were not 
sui  ciently ‘exceptional’ to i nd a violation of Article  3, following N.5 h e partly 
concurring opinion, however, urges the Grand Chamber of the Court to reconsider its 
current approach to expulsion claims of this kind. h e specii c focus of the judges’ 
criticism is the distinction made by the Grand Chamber between individuals who are 
already critically ill whilst in the expelling state and those who are not yet critically ill 
but who are likely to become so if expelled from the host country. In the former case 
applicants may benei t from Article 3 protection against expulsion, whilst applicants 
in the latter category have not to date been protected by Article 3. h e partly concurring 
opinion argues that this distinction is unconvincing and not in line with the spirit of 
the right.6 h e Strasbourg response to medical-related expulsion claims remains 
controversial. Critical voices, both within the judiciary and in commentary responding 
3 ECtHR (Grand Chamber Judgment) 27 May 2008, Case No. 26565/05, N v. United Kingdom, joint 
dissenting opinion, para. 8: “[…] the view expressed by the majority that such a i nding “would place 
too great a burden on the Contracting States” […] rel ects the real concern that they had in mind: if 
the applicant were allowed to remain in the United Kingdom to benei t from the care that her 
survival requires, then the resources of the State would be overstretched. Such a consideration runs 
counter to the absolute nature of Article  3 of the Convention and the very nature of the rights 
guaranteed by the Convention that  would be completely negated if their enjoyment were to be 
restricted on the basis of policy considerations such as budgetary constraints. So does the implicit 
acceptance by the majority of the allegation that i nding a breach of Article 3 in the present case 
would open up the l oodgates to medical immigration and make Europe vulnerable to becoming the 
“sick-bay” of the world. […]”. See V. Bettinson and A. Jones, “h e integration or exclusion of welfare 
rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: h e removal of foreign nationals with HIV 
at er N v UK (Application No. 26565/05; decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 27 May 2008)”, 31(1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law (2009), p. 83–94; V. 
Mantouvalou, “N. v. UK: No Duty to Rescue the Nearby Needy?”, 72(5) Modern Law Review (2009), 
p. 815–828; D. Stevens, “Asylum seekers and the right to access health care”, 61(4) Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly (2010), p. 363–390. For a contrary view see M. Bossuyt, “Judges on h in Ice: h e 
European Court of Human Rights and the treatment of asylum seekers”, 3(1–2) Inter-American and 
European Human Rights Journal (2010), p. 3–48, at p. 41–43.
4 ECtHR (Judgment) 20 December 2011, Case No. 10486/10, Yoh Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium (judgment 
available in French only).
5 Ibid., para. 83.
6 Ibid., partly concurring opinion, para. 6.
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to N v. United Kingdom, have focused on questioning political constraints that the 
Court has seemingly accepted and the conceptual coherence of the state of health-
based distinction.
h is article revisits the question of how a more appropriately justii ed jurisprudence 
might be achieved for medical-related expulsion claims, and rel ects on what progress 
in this respect might mean for the conceptual development of Article 3. In scholarship 
relating to asylum seekers and the ECHR Bossuyt has highlighted the N v. United 
Kingdom judgment as unusual; as one exception within a general trend of receptiveness 
to the claims of asylum seekers in the Court’s case-law.7 Other recent writing to touch 
upon expulsion and Article 3 has tended to focus on the impact of expulsion case-law 
on the absolute nature of the right8 and on the principle of non-refoulement and the 
interface between ECHR and EU rules.9 It is valuable to revisit medical-related 
expulsion jurisprudence. Greater clarity of reasoning would assist potential applicants, 
their legal advisors and national courts. Recently questions have arisen about whether 
this line of case-law concerning medical conditions should be relevant to an individual 
with a disability10 and this case-law appears to have inl uenced the Court’s approach 
to expulsion cases more broadly.11
Revisiting the Strasbourg approach also matters in light of the potential of medical-
related expulsion judgments to make important contributions to the interpretive 
development of Article 3. h is would be positive. Although the Court’s interpretation 
of the terms within Article 3 over the past 50 years has arguably been coherent and 
consistent12 there remains signii cant scope to develop the interpretation of this right. 
Situations of medical-related expulsion, because they push the boundaries of Article 3, 
should urge the Court to continue to engage in conceptual development. h is is 
7 Bossuyt, supra n. 3, p. 4; M. Bossuyt, “h e Court of Strasbourg Acting as an Asylum Court”, 8(2) 
European Constitutional Law Review (2012), p. 203–254. See also Battjes’ discussion of refoulement 
under Article 3, in which he acknowledges medical cases as a distinctive category; H. Battjes, “In 
Search of a Fair Balance: h e Absolute Character of the Prohibition of Refoulement under Article 3 
Reassessed”, 22(3) Leiden Journal of International Law (2009), p. 583–621.
8 Battjes, supra n. 7; N. Mavronicola and F. Messineo, “Relatively Absolute? h e Undermining of 
Article 3 ECHR in Ahmad v. UK”, 76(3) Modern Law Review (2013), p. 589–619.
9 See, e.g., G. Clayton, “Asylum seekers in Europe: M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece”, 11(4) Human Rights 
Law Review (2011), p.  758–773; L. Lavrysen, “European asylum law and the ECHR: an uneasy 
coexistence”, 4(1) Gottingen Journal of International Law (2012), p. 217–262; J. Mink, “EU Asylum 
Law and Human Rights Protection: Revisiting the Principle of Non-refoulement and the Prohibition 
of Torture and Other Forms of Ill-treatment”, 14(2) European Journal of Migration and Law (2012), 
p. 119–149.
10 ECtHR (Judgment) 29 January 2013, Case No. 60367/10, S.H.H. v. United Kingdom.
11 See reference to N v. United Kingdom at para. 177 of the judgment in ECtHR (Judgment) 10 April 
2012, Case Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09, Baber Ahmad and Others v. 
United Kingdom. h e ECtHR’s statement in this paragraph has been described as a ‘curious’ 
development in Article 3 case-law; Mavronicola and Messineo, supra n. 8, p. 600.
12 See E. Webster, “Degradation: A Human Rights Law Perspective”, in P. Kaufman et al (eds.), 
Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated (Dordrecht, Springer 2011), 
p. 67–84, at p. 72–74.
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signii cant not least because the ECtHR has been recognised as a leader in international 
human rights interpretation of the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.13
In critically analysing the jurisprudence, the present discussion draws attention to 
one aspect of the Strasbourg line of medical-related expulsion case-law which has 
rarely been explicitly acknowledged – these cases do not show a consistent approach 
to establishing what would actually constitute the alleged inhuman/degrading14 
treatment within the situation faced by an individual applicant. h at is to say, there is 
no transparent pinpointing of what is to be judged against the minimum level of 
severity threshold in the application of Article  3.15 In general, the application of 
Article 3 is based upon a clear understanding of what is argued to be the inhuman/
degrading treatment. h is is usually obvious from the facts of the case and if it is not 
the Court’s reasoning normally makes this clear.16 In medical-related expulsion cases 
there is not a transparent or consistent approach to situating the inhuman/degrading 
treatment, which is unique to this one category of Article 3 case.
h e i rst section shows that there is no clear approach to specifying what constitutes 
alleged inhuman/degrading treatment within situations of medical-related expulsion. 
h e second section considers why this has been the case, highlighting ambiguity 
caused by an enlargement of the scope of interpretation of Article 3 in the original 
medical-related expulsion case of D v. United Kingdom, and considers what this 
explanation implies for the future approach of the Strasbourg Court. In the third 
section it is asked, if the Court were to pinpoint the alleged inhuman/degrading 
treatment in a more consistent and transparent way, would this make a dif erence to 
the reasoning of the Court? It is concluded that it is necessary to progress towards a 
more justii able jurisprudence, and that the best way to achieve this is for the Court to 
identify precisely what constitutes the complained-of harm as a constructive i rst step.
13 M.D. Evans and R. Morgan, Preventing Torture – A Study of the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 1998), p. 74; D. Weissbrodt and I. Hortreiter, “h e Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International Human Rights 
Treaties”, 5(1) Buf alo Law Review (1999), p. 1–73, at p. 43–46.
14 ‘Inhuman/degrading’ is used as shorthand for ‘inhuman and/or degrading’. h is does not suggest a 
conceptual elision of the two terms.
15 ECtHR (judgment) 18 January 1978, Case No. 5310/71, Ireland v. United Kingdom, para. 162.
16 For example, in cases concerning conditions of detention it is clear that the conditions themselves 
are argued to amount to inhuman/degrading treatment (E.g. ECtHR (judgment) 19  April 2001, 
Case No. 28524/95, Peers v. Greece, para. 75). In a case concerning, for example, conditions of 
detention and a particular instance of behaviour towards an applicant the Court’s reasoning will 
make clear that each aspect is argued to amount to inhuman/degrading treatment and each is 
separately assessed (E.g. ECtHR (judgment) 24 July 2001, Case No. 44558/98, Valasinas v. Lithuania, 
paras. 98–125).
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2. SITUATING INHUMAN/DEGRADING TREATMENT
h ere is evidence of a number of approaches to situating the alleged inhuman/
degrading treatment within circumstances of medical-related expulsion. h ese 
dif erent approaches can be seen in the judgments of the Strasbourg Court, preceding 
judgments of national courts and in applicants’ claims.
In the well-known case of D v. United Kingdom, when the ECtHR began to apply 
its past case-law to the facts, it appeared clear that the situation that the applicant 
risked facing in his home country was the potential inhuman/degrading treatment. It 
was argued that if the authorities deported the applicant to his home country he 
would die in circumstances of pain and destitution, with no relatives, accommodation 
or access to social support. When the Court concluded its judgment, however, this 
was no longer obvious. It concluded that: ‘the implementation of the decision to 
remove him to St Kitts would amount to inhuman treatment by the respondent 
State’.17 h is conclusion is echoed in Bensaid v. United Kingdom concerning an 
applicant receiving treatment for Schizophrenia.18 Whereas at the outset in both D 
and Bensaid the Court acknowledged its established principles on expulsion and a 
real risk of inhuman/degrading treatment in a receiving state, starting with the 
Soering case,19 it ended by implying that the United Kingdom would inl ict inhuman 
treatment upon the applicant through the act of expulsion. h is suggests potentially 
dif erent instances of Article 3 harm – in the receiving state on the one hand, and by 
the respondent state on the other hand. h is is a key ambiguity which has been present 
in subsequent cases.
In the Grand Chamber judgment and dissenting opinion in N v. United Kingdom, 
and in the related judgments in the United Kingdom courts, there is evidence of both 
understandings – of the prohibited harm as taking place in the receiving state and as 
being inl icted by the respondent state. In addition, there is evidence of a third 
possibility: an understanding of Article  3 harm as the suf ering l owing from an 
illness. h is range of possibilities can be seen in the following examples: Laws LJ in the 
Court of Appeal was of the view that the harm was essentially the lack of resources in 
the home country.20 In the House of Lords, Lord Brown seemed to interpret the harm 
in D as treatment by the host state that exacerbated suf ering l owing from an illness.21 
17 ECtHR (Judgment) 2 May 1997, Case No. 30240/96, D v. United Kingdom, paras. 53–54 [emphasis 
added].
18 ECtHR (Judgment) 6 February 2001, Case No. 44599/98, Bensaid v. United Kingdom, paras. 34–35, 
41.
19 ECtHR (Judgment) 7 July 1989, Case No. 14038/88, Soering v. United Kingdom, para. 92. It is also 
clear that a focus on the risk of inhuman/degrading treatment in the receiving state was what the 
United Kingdom government was expecting in D; ECtHR (judgment) 2  May 1997, Case No. 
30240/96, D v. United Kingdom, para. 42.
20 N v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004) 1 W.L.R. 1182, para. 38.
21 N v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2005) 2 W.L.R. 1124, paras. 80, 93.
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He described the issue in N as being whether “deporting the appellant in the 
circumstances outlined would be subjecting her to inhuman and degrading 
treatment”.22 Lord Nicholls asked whether the act of expulsion would itself amount to 
prohibited treatment.23 h ese statements demonstrate that the way the potential 
inhuman/degrading treatment is identii ed is not uniform or settled. In N v. United 
Kingdom, in the submissions of the Government and of the applicant, it is clear that a 
risk of Article 3 harm was seen to be in the receiving state.24 h e Grand Chamber 
acknowledged this whilst also stating that: “[t]he suf ering which l ows from naturally-
occurring illness […] may be covered by Article  3, where it is […] exacerbated by 
treatment […] for which the authorities can be held responsible […]’.25 Certain of the 
Court’s statements in its overview of the line of case-law subsequent to D v. United 
Kingdom point towards the ‘removal’/‘expulsion’ as the potential Article 3 harm.26 In 
their dissent in N v. United Kingdom, Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielmann 
recognised dif erent possible instances of potential inhuman/degrading treatment, 
occurring separately or in combination.27 h ey i rst expressed the view that Ms N 
faced a real risk of “prohibited treatment in her home country”.28 h ey also expressed 
the view that “deportation of an ‘applicant on his or her death bed’ would in itself be 
inconsistent with the absolute provision of Article 3 […]”.29 h ey also referred to the 
situation where “the harm stems from a naturally occurring illness and a lack of 
adequate resources to deal with it in the receiving country […]”.30 Within this single 
dissenting opinion several possible understandings and combinations of prohibited 
harm are apparent.
In summary, the Strasbourg Court began its application of Article 3 in D v. United 
Kingdom by indicating that the situation in D was regarded as one further step in the 
case-law on expulsion – expulsion to a risk of prohibited treatment in the receiving state 
– and thereby as an extension of an established position. h is perception is a current 
22 Ibid., para.77; see also para. 93.
23 Ibid., para. 8. See also ECtHR (Grand Chamber Judgment) 27 May 2008, Case No. 26565/05, N v. 
United Kingdom, para. 17.
24 ECtHR (Grand Chamber Judgment) 27 May 2008, Case No. 26565/05, N v. United Kingdom, paras. 
22, 25.
25 Ibid., para. 29.
26 Ibid., para. 37, referring to ECtHR (Decision) 15  February 2000, Case No. 46553/99, S.C.C. v. 
Sweden; para. 39, referring to ECtHR (Decision) 24 June 2003, Case No. 13669/03, Arcila Henao v. 
h e Netherlands.
27 Ibid., joint dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielman, paras. 20–23.
28 Ibid., joint dissenting opinion, para. 3; see also para. 9.
29 Ibid., joint dissenting opinion, para. 20.
30 Ibid., joint dissenting opinion, para. 5. h is view is rel ected in the non-medical expulsion case of 
Sui  and Elmi v. United Kingdom referring to N v. United Kingdom: “In reaching its conclusions, the 
Court noted that the alleged future harm would emanate not from the intentional acts or omission 
of public authorities or non-State bodies but from a naturally occurring illness and the lack of 
sui  cient resources to deal with it in the receiving country.” ECtHR (Judgment) 28 June 2011, Case 
Nos. 8319/07; 11449/07, Sui  and Elmi v. United Kingdom, para. 281.
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one, seen in the argument of the applicant in Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium.31 But, in a 
seemingly contradictory move, the Court’s conclusion in D was less clear about whether 
its approach was a simple extension of previous expulsion case-law or whether it was 
qualitatively dif erent. Its conclusion was ambiguous about whether the inhuman/
degrading treatment was the situation that would be faced by the applicant in his home 
country, or whether the inhuman/degrading treatment was the act of expulsion by the 
United Kingdom state, or something else in between, including deriving from the illness 
itself. h is has led, in subsequent cases, to several possible harms to which the label of 
inhuman/degrading treatment might be attached. h is implies that there are a number 
of possible focal points for judging whether there is indeed a risk of prohibited treatment.
3. D v. UNITED KINGDOM: THE SOURCE OF INHUMAN/
DEGRADING TREATMENT AND THE LIMITS OF STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY
It is evident in arguments put forward by states in expulsion cases generally that they 
are concerned in a broad, fundamental sense about the attribution of responsibility 
for far-removed harm.32 In N v. United Kingdom the ECtHR seemed to accept 
economics-based policy considerations when judging the applicability of Article 3, for 
which it has been criticised in dissent and in commentary, as noted above. Such 
willingness to entertain health-care immigration ‘l oodgates’ arguments in medical-
related expulsion cases can be seen to rel ect a fundamental question about where the 
limits should lie in terms of the responsibility of Council of Europe states. It is 
inevitable in this class of medical-related expulsion case that the claims highlight an 
uncomfortable tension between global wealth and healthcare inequalities and the 
limited capacity of a regional human rights system to protect the individual within 
this. Even if the reality of this context might have impeded to some extent the Court’s 
openness to i nding Article 3 violations in medical-related expulsion cases, it does not 
explain a lack of consistent identii cation of the potential harm in medical-related 
expulsion cases. h is atypical aspect of the case-law does not stem from this backdrop, 
but rather can be seen as more concretely rooted in the ambiguous conclusion in D v. 
United Kingdom, which continues to shape the Strasbourg approach.
31 ECtHR (Judgment) 20 December 2011, Case No. 10486/10, Yoh Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, para. 76: 
“[S]i on l’expulse vers le Cameroun, elle y courra un risque reel d’être soumise à des traitements 
inhumains et dégradants contraires à l’article 3 […]”; see also reference to the inhuman nature of the 
situation in Cameroon at para. 78. h e domestic decision of the Conseil Contentieux des Etrangers / 
De Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen is available in Flemish; 23 December 2009, No. 36562, 
available via: <www.rvv-cce.be>.
32 E.g. ECtHR (Grand Chamber Judgment) 21 January 2011, Case No. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece; ECtHR (Judgment) 28 June 2011, Case Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, Sui  and Elmi v. United 
Kingdom; ECtHR (Judgment) 17 January 2012, Case No. 8139/09, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United 
Kingdom.
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In the D v. United Kingdom case it is reasonable to assume that the Court could 
have foreseen concern by states parties to the Convention about the implications of 
this decision. D was initially presented by the Court as representing one further step 
in the body of general expulsion case-law. As such, it represented an expansion of the 
scope of the right to new lengths. h e prohibited treatment in this case was 
geographically distant, as in previous expulsion cases concerning a risk of harm in the 
receiving state, but here it was even further-removed from the institutions of the 
expelling state; that is, it would be inl icted, neither by institutions of another state33 
nor by identii able private actors within another state,34 but by a new source – an 
indeterminate source, rather than (a) particular, identii able actor(s). h e government 
of St Kitts was not responsible for the lack of family support, and it could not be found 
to be at fault if it was unable to provide accommodation or support equivalent to that 
which the applicant had been receiving in the United Kingdom. h e harm would be 
inl icted, neither by agents of the state nor by private persons within the home country. 
h e ‘conditions of adversity’ would be nobody’s fault as such. h is was a new 
progression in the case-law at that time. h e accepted sources of inhuman/degrading 
treatment were expanded, which represented a signii cant enlargement of the scope of 
application of Article 3. h e link between the state and the prohibited treatment would 
be stretched further than it had been before and this had the potential to provoke 
anxiety amongst states parties about the limits of responsibility for far-removed harm. 
In the Court’s ambiguous conclusion (“the implementation of the decision to remove 
him to St Kitts would amount to inhuman treatment by the respondent State”)35 the 
prohibited treatment could be read as the act of expulsion inl icted by the United 
Kingdom, despite having been initially suggested to be constituted by the situation in 
the applicant’s home country. h e responsibility of the state was bolstered by this form 
of expression because it suggested direct inl iction of harm by the state. As D remains 
a pivotal case, this ambiguity has become a key feature of medical-related expulsion 
cases.
In accepting a new source of inhuman/degrading treatment the Strasbourg Court 
justii ably expanded the scope of application of Article 3. It has long been accepted 
that the term ‘treatment’ could be interpreted as a set of circumstances; the meaning 
of ‘treatment’ which is visible in detention conditions cases.36 It was a progressive 
interpretation of the Court to accept that a set of circumstances could be inhuman/
degrading even if inl icted by no one identii able actor/group (responsibility of the 
expelling state would be engaged by the power to expel or not expel). One consequence 
of the ambiguous approach to situating the proscribed treatment in D v. United 
33 ECtHR (Judgment) 7 July 1989, Case No. 14038/88, Soering v. United Kingdom, para. 92.
34 ECtHR (Grand Chamber Judgment) 29  April 1997, Case No. 24573/94, H.L.R. v. France, paras. 
39–40.
35 ECtHR (Judgment) 2 May 1997, Case No. 30240/96, D v. United Kingdom, paras. 53–54 [emphasis 
added].
36 E.g. ECtHR (judgment) 19 April 2001, Case No. 28524/95, Peers v. Greece, para. 75.
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Kingdom has been that this new source of inhuman/degrading treatment has not been 
critiqued in scholarship. In the Court’s case-law an indeterminate source of inhuman/
degrading treatment has gradually become more common. In a non-medical expulsion 
case the Court has referred to the “cumulative risks” faced by an asylum seeker if 
returned to Afghanistan, where these risks stemmed in part from “Afghan society”.37 
h is case provides an example of harm which would stem from no one identii able 
actor, but from an indeterminate source. h e Court has increasingly accepted that a 
real risk of prohibited treatment can stem from “dire humanitarian conditions” and 
“a situation of general violence”.38 h erefore, the interpretation of Article  3 that 
arguably led to the ambiguous conclusion in the i rst medical-related expulsion case 
can be seen as no longer novel, and need not be a barrier to the Court transparently 
situating the harm in medical-related expulsion cases today.
4. BACK TO BASICS: THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 3
In medical-related expulsion case-law three broad ways of situating the Article 3 harm 
can be seen: inhuman/degrading treatment inl icted by sources within the receiving 
state; inhuman/degrading treatment inl icted by the expelling state; and inhuman/
degrading treatment ‘l owing’ from illness.39 h is section considers how judicial 
reasoning might dif er in future medical-related expulsion cases if the Court would 
revisit the step of identifying the harm being complained of, and rel ects on an appropriate 
response to judicial critique of Strasbourg’s restrictive application of Article 3.
4.1. THE NATURE OF ARTICLE 3 HARM
4.1.1. Inhuman/degrading treatment inl icted by sources within the receiving 
state: the absence of moral and social support or inaccessibility of 
life-sustaining medical care
In judgments pertaining to inhuman/degrading treatment and expulsion beyond the 
medical context it is in general clear that the prohibited harm which risks occurring 
37 ECtHR (Judgment) 20 July 2010, Case No. 23505/09, N v. Sweden, para. 62.
38 ECtHR (Judgment) 28 June 2011, Case Nos. 8319/07; 11449/07, Sui  and Elmi v. United Kingdom, 
paras. 292–293. Both this judgment and N v. Sweden (ECtHR (Judgment) 20 July 2010, Case No. 
23505/09) are described by Marc Bossuyt as controversial.  h is is on the basis of the Court’s 
relationship with national courts and governments and not because of a broadening of the sources 
of inhuman/degrading treatment. Indeed, Bossuyt recognises the signii cance of this broadening 
scope of sources of harm. Bossuyt, supra n. 7, p. 219–221.
39 It is possible that more than one instance of inhuman/degrading treatment could be argued to 
co-exist within the situation of a particular applicant. h e dissenting judges in N were of the view 
that dif erent forms of inhuman/degrading treatment should have been seen to coexist; ECtHR 
(Grand Chamber Judgment) 27 May 2008, Case No. 26565/05, N v. United Kingdom, joint dissenting 
opinion, paras. 20–23.
Elaine Webster
46 Intersentia
would take place in the receiving state, as noted above. If the potential Article 3 harm 
would occur in the receiving state the root of the harm would be an indeterminate 
combination of actors and elements rather than one particular, identii able source. To 
identify inhuman/degrading treatment as harm that would occur in the receiving 
state it is necessary to recognise this source of harm. ‘Treatment’ in this context would 
be an amalgamation of circumstances; a situation.
In medical-related expulsion cases there are two key aspects of the situation in the 
receiving state: the inaccessibility of life-sustaining medication and care, and the 
absence of moral and social support. To determine what the risk consists of for a 
particular applicant the Court should be guided by his/her current stage of illness. 
Where an individual is in stable health at the time of the proposed expulsion and 
needs to access medical care in order to remain well, as in the cases that have followed 
D, the harm that s/he would be subjected to must be inaccessibility of that medical 
care. h is implies, i rstly, that the absence of home country support – referred to in N 
v. United Kingdom40 – should not be a decisive consideration in the Court’s assessment 
of whether the situation would be inhuman/degrading. Inaccessibility of medical care 
cannot be negated by the presence of moral and social support. Secondly, if an 
applicant is in stable health this implies that the degree of inaccessibility of medical 
care should be pivotal. h e Court would need to further develop a test for ascertaining 
what amounts to ef ective inaccessibility. In applications to date the respondent state 
has argued that some medical care is available to the applicant, even if not of the same 
standard and with i nancial and practical barriers41 and the Court has engaged with 
this to an extent, referring to sources such as World Health Organisation reports.42 
h e Court should assess the degree of inaccessibility of medical care with the same 
level of detail as it assesses whether there is a real risk of inhuman/degrading treatment 
from actors within the receiving state in non-medical expulsion cases.43
For an individual in a terminal stage of illness the potential harm is not ultimately 
the inaccessibility of life-sustaining medical care but the circumstances of the end of 
life. h is implies that the situation in the receiving state should be subject to a relative 
assessment of the minimum level of severity. All aspects of the situation, including the 
level of moral and social support, should be equally relevant in determining whether 
the amalgamation of circumstances should be described as inhuman/degrading 
treatment. Although, as Stevens observes, claims concerning HIV/Aids in which an 
40 ECtHR (Grand Chamber Judgment) 27 May 2008, Case No. 26565/05, N v. United Kingdom, paras. 
48, 50.
41 ECtHR (Decision) 15  February 2000, Case No. 46553/99, S.C.C. v. Sweden; ECtHR (Judgment) 
6 February 2001, Case No. 44599/98, Bensaid v. United Kingdom, paras. 31, 38.
42 E.g. ECtHR (Decision) 25 November 2004, Case No. 25629/04, Amegnigan v. Netherlands; ECtHR 
(Grand Chamber Judgment) 27 May 2008, Case No. 26565/05, N v. United Kingdom, para. 19.
43 See, e.g., ECtHR (Grand Chamber Judgment) 15  November 1996, Case No. 22414/93, Chahal v. 
United Kingdom. See Battjes, supra n. 7, p. 608–612 for discussion of how the standard of ‘real risk’ 
has been applied in medical cases.
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applicant is terminally ill are signii cantly less likely to come before the Court in 
future as a result of advances in medical treatment,44 an end-of-life dimension could 
remain relevant to a non-national applicant in the terminal phase of a dif erent illness.
4.1.2. Inhuman/degrading treatment inl icted by the expelling state: lack of 
respect at the end of life or withdrawal of medical care
P.J. Duf y, in an early article deliberating whether expulsion could raise an issue under 
Article  3 if the risk of prohibited treatment would stem from private individuals, 
expressed the view that the “theoretical basis for applying Article 3 to expulsion cases 
is that the act of expulsion itself in all the circumstances constitutes inhuman and 
degrading treatment”.45 h e theoretical basis for expulsion cases suggested by Duf y 
is not explicitly evidenced in expulsion cases.46 h ere may be a view that inhuman/
degrading treatment is inl icted by both the sending state and the receiving state but 
in general this is not explicit in the case-law.
Article  3 ‘treatment’ seems to have been perceived as harm inl icted by the 
expelling state, both by the House of Lords and by the Strasbourg Court in N.47 If there 
is a risk of inhuman/degrading treatment inl icted by the expelling state the ‘treatment’ 
would be a series of actions towards the applicant. h is interpretation accords with 
the most common meaning of the word ‘treatment’. h e source of the inhuman/
degrading treatment would be state actors/institutions, and responsibility of the state 
under the Convention would therefore be inherent. h ere is perhaps an intuitive 
preference for seeing the prohibited treatment as inl icted by the expelling state in 
medical-related expulsion cases, due to the simplicity of this understanding of the 
source of harm and the form that treatment takes.
Two key aspects within the expelling state might be argued to be inhuman/
degrading treatment: a lack of respect at the end of life, or the withdrawal of medical 
care in conjunction with expulsion. Again, the Court should be guided by an 
applicant’s current stage of illness. h e Grand Chamber has so far maintained that an 
applicant must essentially be close to death at the time of the expulsion. h is 
requirement might be rationalised on the basis that persons who are dying are in a 
special category and should be accorded special consideration. h e Court, if it were to 
explicitly adopt this understanding of inhuman/degrading treatment, should explain 
44 Stevens, supra n. 3, p. 372.
45 P.J. Duf y, “Article  3 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, 32(2) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1983), p. 316–346, at p. 339.
46 Expulsion case-law consistently refers to the risk of ill-treatment in the state to which an individual 
will be sent, as noted above (supra, n. 20). A recent example is ECtHR (Judgment) 27 June 2013, Case 
Nos. 66523/10 66523/10, S.A. v. Sweden, para. 41.
47 h e same perception is visible in other cases which have cited D v. United Kingdom; see ECtHR 
(Judgment) 29  April 2002, Case No. 2346/02, Pretty v. United Kingdom, para. 53; R (Pretty) v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions (2001) 3 W.L.R. 1598, para. 14.
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why a lack of respect towards a person who is dying could fall within the meaning of 
inhuman/degrading treatment. h e Court might be reluctant to make such a statement 
as it would be conscious of a lack of moral consensus within Council of Europe states 
on the ‘death with dignity’ debate and variations in the legal regulation of end-of-life 
interventions at state level.48 If the Court did adopt this interpretation it would be 
obliged to move to new conceptual ground.
If the Court were to pinpoint the inhuman/degrading treatment as the withdrawal 
of medical care through expulsion it should be clear about why the combination of 
expulsion from the host state and withdrawal of medical care might amount to 
inhuman/degrading treatment. Whether the form of state obligation in play would be 
described as positive or negative49 would not lead to a practical dif erence in outcome 
since state responsibility would be inherent either way. h e Court should undertake a 
relative assessment of whether an individual, subjected to simultaneous expulsion 
and deprivation of life-sustaining care, would suf er prohibited treatment. h is way of 
situating the Article 3 harm implies that the applicant would be in a stable condition 
at the time of the proposed expulsion, which is of course contrary to the practice of 
the Court to date.
4.1.3. Inhuman/degrading treatment ‘l owing’ from illness
In Bensaid v. United Kingdom the Court referred to suf ering as a result of ill-health, 
noting that this suf ering might fall within Article 3’s scope.50 It is not clear what is 
envisaged as the potential inhuman/degrading treatment from this perspective:
“h e suf ering which l ows from naturally-occurring illness, physical or mental, 
may be covered by Article 3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, 
whether l owing from conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for 
which the authorities can be held responsible […].”51
h ere is reference to ‘suf ering’ made worse by ‘treatment’ of the state. h is might 
indicate that the actions of the state would in themselves amount to inhuman/
degrading treatment because they exacerbate suf ering caused by illness. Alternatively, 
this statement might indicate that the suf ering itself would be the potential inhuman/
degrading treatment, for which the state would be responsible because of its own 
actions which exacerbate suf ering.
48 ECtHR (Judgment) 20 January 2011, Case No. 31322/07, Hass v. Switzerland, para. 55.
49 I.e., a negative state obligation not to inl ict inhuman/degrading treatment or a positive obligation 
to prevent inhuman/degrading treatment by the state’s own agents.
50 ECtHR (Judgment) 6 February 2001, Case No. 44599/98, Bensaid v. United Kingdom, para. 37.
51 ECtHR (Grand Chamber Judgment) 27 May 2008, Case No. 26565/05, N v. United Kingdom, para. 
29.
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In a case brought against Lithuania concerning gender reassignment treatment, in 
which D v. United Kingdom was applied but which preceded N v. United Kingdom, the 
Court stated that:
“Article  3 entails a positive obligation on the part of the State to protect the 
individual from acute ill-treatment, whether physical or mental, whatever its 
source. h us if the source is a naturally occurring illness, the treatment for which 
could involve the responsibility of the State but is not forthcoming or is patently 
inadequate, an issue may arise under this provision […].”52
h is paragraph indicates that inhuman/degrading treatment can be brought about by 
an illness and the state’s responsibility engaged by a failure to respond adequately, 
thus breaching an obligation of protection from Article 3 harm. If this interpretation 
is correct, ‘treatment’ would take the form of a situation of suf ering, which would be 
argued to be inhuman/degrading within the meaning of Article 3. It is this situation 
that should be the focus of the Court’s assessment of whether the nature of the 
suf ering caused by the illness would reach the minimum level of severity.
Arguably, to see Article 3 harm as being capable of emanating from any source 
entails a signii cant enlargement of the scope of Article 3, which in the past has applied 
to harm brought about by human actors/human-made societal conditions and not 
suf ering which is ‘naturally-occurring’. If the Court were to adopt this particular 
interpretation it should explain the conceptual rationale behind accepting that 
Article 3 harm can be inl icted by illness and how this i ts with the Court’s established 
interpretation of inhuman/degrading treatment.
4.2. TOWARDS A JUSTIFIABLE JURISPRUDENCE
h e reasoning of the Strasbourg Court should be revisited from the perspective of 
transparently situating the alleged inhuman/degrading treatment. h e dif erent ways 
in which the Court might situate inhuman/degrading treatment give rise to dif erent 
implications for the reasoning of the Court. h e foregoing discussion clarii es that 
situations of advanced-stage illness and stable illness should attract dif erent reasoning 
in an assessment of the minimum level of severity, whether the Article  3 harm is 
situated within the receiving state, in the expelling state, or seen to l ow from illness. 
It indicates that whether the Strasbourg approach is coherent – acceptance of a 
violation of Article  3 in a situation of terminal illness whilst refusing Article  3 
protection to applicants who are not yet terminally ill – should depend directly upon 
how the harm is identii ed and assessed.
Judicial critique itself seems to view the harm in medical-related expulsion cases 
as inl icted by the respondent state, which need not necessarily be the case. h is 
52 ECtHR (Judgment) 11 September 2007, Case No. 27527/03, L v. Lithuania, para. 46.
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becomes clear if the potential inhuman/degrading treatment is more clearly 
pinpointed. h ere are two potential forms of Article 3 harm implied in this critique: 
lack of respect by the state towards a dying person, and the withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical care. h ese situations are not analogous and the evaluation of each 
should be dif erent. If the Court were to uncouple these two situations, on the one 
hand, it would be more dii  cult for the Court to compare the circumstances of 
applicants in stable health to those of applicants at advanced stage of illness. It is 
possible that this approach could encourage a new line of case-law for medical 
expulsion claims concerning withdrawal of, or lack of access to, life-sustaining 
medication. h ese cases need not be artii cially pressed into a D v. United Kingdom 
mould because in D the applicant was not ultimately complaining about restriction of 
access to life-sustaining medication. On the other hand, the Court might maintain 
that the Article 3 threshold could be crossed in respect of terminally ill applicants but 
not in respect of applicants in stable health. h is is because it would not necessarily be 
the case that it would be unconvincing to see the threshold as crossed in one situation 
and not in the other, just as it is possible to see the threshold as crossed in the case of 
one applicant, for example at advanced stage of illness, and not in the case of a dif erent 
applicant, who may also be at an advanced stage of illness. It is right that the assessment 
of whether treatment can be described as inhuman/degrading should be a relative one 
depending on all the circumstances of each individual applicant. h erefore, clearly 
situating the Article 3 harm would not point to a single conclusion but would allow 
the Court to move towards a more appropriately justii ed jurisprudence.
To do so would bring the reasoning in medical-related expulsion cases into line 
with the rest of Article 3 case-law in which the alleged harm is clearly demarcated. It 
would also allow for a better understanding of how the interpretation of Article 3 in 
this line of cases might impact upon the application of the right to new, related 
situations. For example, to health-related expulsion claims in which the applicant is 
not reliant upon access to specii c medical care; to medical-related claims in which the 
applicant is a national of the respondent state; or to claims by applicants at the end of 
life within a national context.
As to whether there is one preferable approach in medical-related expulsion cases, 
from the perspective of doctrinal cohesion, there is a strong argument that the Court 
should place this line of case-law i rmly in the tradition of non-medical expulsion 
cases, in which the risk of Article 3 harm stems from the receiving state. It is not clear 
that medical-related expulsion cases should be treated as qualitatively dif erent from 
non-medical expulsion cases. As noted above, there has perhaps been an implicit view 
in expulsion cases that, even if the inhuman/degrading treatment would be inl icted 
in the receiving state, the expelling state would also inl ict inhuman/degrading 
treatment by choosing to expel the person to a situation of such risk. Perhaps the 
understanding of the harm in all expulsion cases would benei t from renewed 
consideration, but a prerequisite for this is that the Article  3 harm should be 
transparently demarcated.
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If the risk of Article 3 harm were seen to stem exclusively from sources within the 
home country both applicants at advanced stage of illness and in stable health could 
argue a violation of Article 3. h e weighting of factors within the Court’s assessment 
of the minimum level of severity should be dif erent in respect of each: if the applicant 
is terminally ill, the set of circumstances that would face him/her in the home 
country should be assessed; if an applicant is in stable health at the time of the 
proposed expulsion, the degree of access to life-sustaining medication should be the 
crucial test determining whether this situation would cross the minimum severity 
threshold. If the Court were to place medical-related expulsion cases exclusively in 
the tradition of cases where the risk of Article 3 harm stems from the receiving state, 
this would also further strengthen the acceptance of the ‘indeterminate’ source of 
harm, described above as a key development which led to the ambiguous conclusion 
in D v. United Kingdom. h is interpretation, already relied upon in N v. Sweden 
concerning societal gender-based discrimination,53 could play a signii cant role in 
the future development of the scope of application of Article  3; for example, this 
interpretation might be of particular relevance in situations concerning socio-
economic conditions.54
It is not possible in the scope of this article to address whether there is one 
preferable approach from a normative perspective. h is would be best achieved by 
putting forward conceptual understandings of the terms ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ 
which i t with, and build upon, an in-depth analysis of the conceptual scope of these 
terms as they have developed in the Court’s case-law. A normative argument should 
address a number of conceptual questions. h ese include: Why might it be inhuman/
degrading treatment for a state to show a lack of respect for a person who is in the i nal 
stages of life? For example, should the way that human life ends be seen to hold special 
signii cance, and if so in which sense?55 If inhuman/degrading treatment is inl icted by 
the expelling state, is it relevant that life-sustaining medical care is deemed by the 
state to be legitimately withdrawn because the person is a non-national? h at is, might 
53 Supra n. 38.
54 h ere is a growing body of literature on the socio-economic reach and potential of the ECHR. For 
example, C. O’Cinneide, “A modest proposal: Destitution, State responsibility and the European 
Convention on Human Rights” 5  European Human Rights Law Review (2008), p.  583–605; E. 
Palmer, “Protecting socio-economic rights through the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Trends and developments in the European Court of Human Rights”, 2(4) Erasmus Law Review 
(2009), p. 397–425; L. Clements and J. Simmons, “European Court of Human Rights: Sympathetic 
Unease”, in M. Langford (ed.), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2008), p. 409–427; J. Kenny, “European 
Convention on Human Rights and social welfare”, 5 European Human Rights Law Review (2010), 
p. 495–503. See also the partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó in ECtHR (Grand 
Chamber Judgment) 21 January 2011, Case No. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.
55 Ronald Dworkin and Charles Foster have described the end of life as rel ective of the entire life 
lived; See R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia (London, 
HarperCollins 1993), p.  199; C. Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2011), p. 165.
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there be a pertinent dimension of nationality-based discrimination?56 To what extent 
can dif erent forms of harm within situations of medical-related expulsion be seen to 
convincingly fall within the meaning of inhuman/degrading treatment, as opposed to 
being morally problematic in some other sense?57 If the Strasbourg Court would 
engage more transparently with how the Article 3 harm is demarcated it would create 
an opportunity to address such questions and to develop the interpretive scope of 
Article 3 based on the conceptual meaning of the terms ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’.
5. CONCLUSION
It has been argued that a preliminary step is missing in medical-related expulsion 
case-law, of transparently situating the harm being complained of. h ere is evidence 
of a range of possible ways of situating the alleged inhuman/degrading treatment, 
which can be seen as rooted in an ambiguous conclusion in the case of D v. United 
Kingdom. If the Article 3 harm is not clearly situated the application of the right – in 
future medical-related expulsion cases and in other situations which draw upon this 
irregular line of case-law – will inevitably be l awed because there is no focus for 
judging whether a foreseeable situation would fall within the meaning of the terms 
‘inhuman’, ‘degrading’ and ‘treatment’.
Greater transparency in situating the harm in medical-related expulsion cases 
would contribute to addressing concerns about the state of health distinction that has 
resulted in a denial of Convention protection to many applicants. h e question of 
whether it is conceptually defensible to maintain the distinction based on the 
applicant’s state of health, and the broader question of whether the Court should i nd 
that Article 3 has been violated in cases similar to N v. United Kingdom, is tied to how 
the harm is situated. h e approach advocated in this article does not necessarily imply 
a greater likelihood of i ndings of Article 3 violations.58 It is a proper exercise of the 
56 h e Strasbourg Court has accepted that discrimination could in principle fall within Article 3, in 
the sense of being constitutive of prohibited harm, rather than an additional harm (based on 
Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with Article 3). See ECtHR (Judgment) 27 September 1999, Case 
Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, para. 121. In the context of border 
restrictions on the movement of non-nationals, Dembour and Kelly observe: “We do not rule out 
that future generations may put national discrimination on a par with racial and gender 
discrimination in terms of abhorrence.”; M. Dembour and T. Kelly, “Introduction”, in M. Dembour 
and T. Kelly (eds.), Are Human Rights for Migrants? Critical Rel ections on the Status of Irregular 
Migrants in Europe and the United States (Oxon, Routledge 2011), p. 1–22, at p. 5.
57 J. Waldron, “h e Coxford Lecture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: h e Words h emselves”, 
23(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (2010), p. 269–286, at p. 276.
58 An alternative, or at least additional, direction for medical-related expulsion claims is the Article 8 
route. h e decision by the ECtHR not to examine the Article 8 claim in N v. United Kingdom (ECtHR 
(Grand Chamber Judgment) 27 May 2008, Case No. 26565/05) was criticised in the dissent in that 
case. h e decision not to examine perhaps indicates that the Court was clear that an interference 
with the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life would have been justii ed. If there would 
be an interference, then the proportionality analysis should be carried out.
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Court’s role to determine whether harm falls within the scope of Article 3, but the 
basic step of demarcating the alleged harm within the Court’s reasoning should be its 
i rst step.
h is step would make a dif erence to the way the Strasbourg Court’s decisions are 
reached in medical-related expulsion cases and allow for a richer and more 
appropriately justii ed jurisprudence to develop. It is necessary to move towards a 
better-justii ed jurisprudence, not ultimately because the current situation as concerns 
medical-related expulsion seems untenable, but fundamentally because the Court 
should fuli l its core role of developing the interpretation of the Convention rights 
themselves. To unpack more explicitly what precisely might constitute the harm 
would have positive implications for the doctrinal development of Article  3 by 
allowing for a fuller understanding of how principles developed in this line of cases 
might inl uence the future interpretation and application of the right in new, 
challenging situations that will inevitably arise.
